

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NEA-06 SP-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03

IO-04 EB-04 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SAI-01 ARA-06

EURE-00 DRC-01 /064 W

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P R 111300Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3099

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4579

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SW, US, CI, CA

SUBJECT: A CONVERSATION WITH SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER ON US POLICY  
IN CHILE

REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 4176; (B) STOCKHOLM 3839; (C) STOCKHOLM 4491

1. SUMMARY: I CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER PALME PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE NEXT WEEK FOR A FIVE-DAY VISIT TO CANADA. THE PURPOSE OF MY CALL WAS TO DISCUSS THE VISIT AND TO CONTINUE THE ONGOING DIALOGUE I HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH THE SWEDISH LEADER. MUCH OF THE CONVERSATION CENTERED ON US POLICY TOWARDS CHILE AND SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER ALLUDED TO AS THE "US-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE" I.E. THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT FORD SEPTEMBER 16 THAT THE US ASSISTANCE TO CERTAIN GROUPS IN CHILE "IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE IN CHILE." PALME INDICATED  
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HE INTENDED TO RAISE THIS POINT WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU.

I SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH TO IMPRESS UPON THE PRIME MINISTER THE TOTAL LACK OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND US POLICY IN CHILE. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO THE MIDEAST. END SUMMARY.

2. AS PART OF MY ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER PALME, I CALLED ON HIM OCTOBER 10 FOR AN HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION. I ALSO WISHED TO SOUND OUT THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS FORTHCOMING FIVE-DAY VISIT TO CANADA, WHICH BEGINS OCTOBER 17 (REF A).

3. AFTER THANKING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR RECEIVING ME PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, I ASKED HIM TO TELL ME A LITTLE ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT AND THE GOALS HE HOPED TO ACHIEVE IN OTTAWA. PALME REPLIED THAT IN A SENSE, THE VISIT WAS A "PERSONAL" ONE. HE SAID HE HAD MET TRUDEAU FOR THE FIRST TIME THIS YEAR AT A CLUB OF ROME MEETING IN SALZBURG, AND THE TWO MEN HAD QUICKLY DEVELOPED A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP AND TRUDEAU HAD ASKED HIM TO VISIT CANADA. CONTINUING, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD MANY THINGS IN COMMON, INCLUDING A SIMILAR APPROACH TO SOCIAL POLICY AND EVEN TO FOREIGN POLICY. WHEN I QUERIED HIM ON THIS LATTER POINT, HE NOTED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES ARE MIDDLE-LEVEL POWERS, BOTH ARE HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED, AND BOTH ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON INTERNATIONAL TRADE. THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE SAID, HAVE A COMMON APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPING NATIONS. MOREOVER, HE ADDED, HE HAD FOUND TRUDEAU TO BE AN EXTREMELY INTERESTING MAN AND HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO THE VISIT. IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DEVELOPED A LIKING FOR TRUDEAU AND CONSIDERS THAT HE AND THE CANADIAN LEADER HAVE MUCH IN COMMON.

4. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER I HAD READ AND REREAD HIS FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH AT PITEA (A-264) AND FELT THAT HE HAD OVERDRAWN THE CASE IN DESCRIBING THE DANGERS TO SMALL POWERS RESULTING FROM SUPERPOWER COOPERATION. I POINTED OUT THAT, AT LEAST AT PRESENT, THE SUPERPOWERS HAVE A RELATIVELY LIMITED AREA OF MUTUAL INTEREST, I.E. THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. FURTHERMORE, I CONTINUED, THE US IS CERTAINLY AWARE OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF ALL PEOPLES, AND IT SEEMS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE AS WELL, JUDGING FROM AN ARTICLE I READ RECENTLY BY A SOVIET

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ECONOMIST WHO OBSERVED THAT NOT EVEN THE SOVIET UNION IS IMMUNE FROM THE EFFECTS OF WORLDWIDE INFLATION.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT HE HAS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE SUPERPOWER ACCUMULATION OF WEAPONS AND STEADILY INCREASING MILITARY POWER. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT INCREMENTALISM IN WEAPONS WAS USELESS AS A POLITICAL TOOL. PALME CONCEDED THIS POINT BUT THEN RAISED

A BROADER QUESTION. HE SAID THAT IN HIS PITEA SPEECH HE HAD BEEN MOST CONCERNED WITH THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, I.E. THE ASSERTED RIGHT OF A SUPERPOWER TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN NATION. NOW, HE CONTINUED, THE US HAS AFFIRMED ITS OWN VERSION OF THIS DOCTRINE WITH ITS POLICY TOWARD CHILE. PALME SAID THAT, HAD THE US JUSTIFIED ITS "INTERVENTION" IN CHILE SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS OF US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, HE WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN EXCEPTION, (EVEN THOUGH MORALLY HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THIS REASONING), FOR THIS RATIONALE HAD BEEN USED IN THE PAST. HOWEVER, HE CONTINUED, THE US JUSTIFICATION OF ITS ROLE IN CHILE ON THE BASIS OF ITS BENEFIT TO THE CHILEAN PEOPLE CONSTITUTES AN EXTENSION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, A DOCTRINE DANGEROUS FOR SWEDEN.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4579

LIMDIS

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE CHILEAN SITUATION AT SOME LENGTH. I POINTED OUT THAT, WHILE I WAS NOT AN EXPERT ON CHILE,

NEVERTHELESS I DID KNOW THAT THE SITUATION IN CHILE DURING THE LATTER PART OF ALLENDE'S TENURE WAS IN A STATE OF CHAOS, WITH A BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL ORDER. PALME REPLIED THAT, IF THE CHILEAN PEOPLE BELIEVED THIS, THEY COULD HAVE OUSTED ALLENDE IN THE NEXT ELECTIONS. WHEN I QUESTIONED WHETHER ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE, PALME EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN HELD HAD ALLENDE A METICULOUS "LEGALIST," SURVIVED. HE ALSO CRITICIZED US SUPPORT OF THE STRIKING TRUCK DRIVERS IN CHILE, NOTING THAT THE TRUCK STRIKE CUT THE LIFELINE OF THE ELONGATED COUNTRY. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT KNOW HOW MUCH WE HAD SUPPORTED THE TRUCKERS BUT THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT ALLENDE DID NOT FALL BECAUSE OF THE TRUCKERS.

7. CONTINUING, I SAID OUR RECORD IN LATIN AMERICAN, PARTICULARLY  
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SINCE WORLD WAR II, DOES NOT INDICATE ANY INTEREST IN INTERVENING IN THAT CONTINENT, AND I POINTED OUT THAT OUR LATIN AMERICAN FRIENDS CERTAINLY DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE ANY FEAR OF SUCH INTERVENTION BY THE US. I STRESSED THAT OUR POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA WAS BASED ON ACHIEVING CONSENSUS AMONG THE NATIONS IN THE AREA. I SAID THAT ANY COMPARISON OF OUR ROLE IN CHILE WITH THE WARSAW PACT INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS FALLACIOUS SINCE THERE WAS NO SIMILARITY BETWEEN OUR ALLEGED ASSISTANCE TO OPPOSITION PARTIES IN CHILE AND THE SOVIET-LED MOVE INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITH MASSIVE TROOPS AND TANKS. PALME CONCEDED THIS, BUT INSISTED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERVENTION BASED ON THE PERCEIVED INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED WAS A DANGEROUS DOCTRINE AND SAID THAT IT COULD EVEN BE USED AT SOME FUTURE TIME FOR A SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION IN SWEDEN "FOR THE GOOD OF THE SWEDISH PEOPLE." ONLY THE PEOPLE CONCERNED CAN DETERMINE WHAT IS BEST FOR THEIR OWN COUNTRY, THE PRIME MINISTER ASSERTED. BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH HE REGARDS THIS ISSUE, PALME SAID HE INTENDED TO RAISE IT WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU.

8. I SAID I COULD NOT AGREE WITH PALME'S POSITION ON THE US ROLE IN CHILE BUT THAT I WOULD TRANSMIT HIS VIEWS TO MY GOVERNMENT.

9. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO THE MIDEAST, NOTING THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT "NO CONCRETE RESULTS IN TERMS OF AGREEMENTS OR DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENTS" SHOULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE TRIP. I SAID THAT THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED SINCE THE SECRETARY'S PREVIOUS MISSION TO THE MIDEAST; THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HAVE HAD TIME TO STUDY THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. CONTINUING, I POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY, IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS HOPED TO ASCERTAIN THE NEXT STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY, I SAID, WAS NOT GOING TO THE MIDEAST AS AN ARBITER

BUT RATHER AS A MEDIATOR, AND WE ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL BE  
A DELICATE AND TEDIOUS PROCESS.

10. COMMENT: THE PERISTENCE WITH WHICH PALME PURSUED THE  
THEME OF A "US BREZHNEV DOCTRINE" SUGGESTS THAT THIS TOPIC  
WILL ASSUME A PROMINENT PLACE IN HIS SPEECHES AND TALKS WITH  
FOREIGN LEADERS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS TO COME. IT TIES IN  
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VERY NEATLY WITH HIS CAMPAIGN TO FOCUS THE ATTENTION OF THE  
SMALL NATIONS ON THE DANGERS TO THEM ARISING FROM SUPERPOWER  
COOPERATION (REF C). IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF THE  
CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER GIVES A SYMPATHETIC HEARING TO THIS  
EFFORT TO PORTRAY OUR CONDUCT TOWARDS CHILE AS PROJECTING A GENERAL  
THREAT TO SMALL POWERS. STRAUZ-HUPE

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## Message Attributes

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